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PROBATIONARY EMPLOYMENT
PERIODS AND THE EMPLOYMENT-ATWILL DOCTRINE
Gamewell Gantt
James P. Jolly

Introduction
At least two earlier articles' have expressed the thought that references to
probationary employment periods in employment applications, employee
handbooks, and company policy manuals could subject employers to liability for wrongful discharge in spite of the employment-at-will doctrine. The
purpose of this paper is to examine recent case law to determine the strength
of the above theory.
To do so, the authors reviewed 22 appellate court decisions from 14 jurisdictions. Twenty-one of the 22 appellate cases reviewed were decided between
the years of 1983 and 1989. In addition, one 1987 lower trial court decision,
which specifically involved a probationary period of employment from the
Delaware state court system, was also examined. Table 1 following the text
of this article summarizes the holdings in the various cases by states in alphabetical order. Table 2, entitled "Case Citations," gives the citations to
the case~ summarized in Table I.

The Doctrine
At the onset, let it be said that at least one of the co-authors of this paper
is somewhat critical of the employment-at-will doctrine and fully agrees with
Texas Supreme Court Justice Kilgarlin, who stated in Sabine Pilot Service,
Inc. v. Hauck that "(a)bsolute employment-at-will is a relic of early industrial times, conjuring up visions of ~weat shops described by Charles Dickens and his contemporaries. The doctrine belongs in a museum, not in our
law."'
The employment-at-will doctrine is also often referred 10 as the terrninationat-will rule. Sim ply stated, the rule holds that an employment agreement for
an indefinite period is presumed to be "at-will" and that the agreement may
be terminated by either party at any time, for any reason. Most often this
means that the employer is deemed to have the right to fire an employee at
any time for no reason at all, or even for a bad reason, or as the Supreme
Court of Mississippi recently stated
(The typical case) . . . presents us with a story all the more depressing
for being sadly familiar. Willis Perry served Sears, Roebuck faithfully
and with distinction for some twenty years. He was almost within sight
of retirement when Sears unceremoniously dumped him because of a
personality conflict with his immediate supervisor.'
Unfortunately for Mr. Perry, all the Mississippi court cou ld say was that
the Golden Rule is not a rule of law. Relying upon the traditional
23

employment-at-will doctrine, the court upheld a summary judgment in favor
of the employer.

Judicial Inroads
Some judicial inroads have been made upon the termination-at-will rule
and they can generally be classified as fallin g into one of three major
categories:
I) tort actions for wrongful discharges in violation of public policy,
2) contract actions for breach of implied-in-fact contractual limitations on
the rule, and
3) contract actions for breach of contracl based on implied in-law duties
of good faith and fair dealing.
Numerous commentators have previously dealt with the various tort theories based on public policy and with the contract theories based upon the
implied-in-law duties of good faith and fair dealing. Accordingly, the scope
of this paper is limited to the legal effect, if any, of employer references to
probationary employment period~ in employment applications, employee
handbooks, and/or company policy manuals under the implied-in-fact contract theory of recovery.
Professors James P. Jolly and Jame\ G. Frier~on in a June 1989 study
of American Society for Personnel Admini~tration (ASPA) members found
that 8% of the respondents' firms still made reference to probationary periods of employment in their job application forms: Moreover, among the
health care industry firm, responding to their survey, Professors Jolly and
Frierson found that 240/o of the firms referred to probationary or temporary
periods of employment ranging anywhere From two weeks to six months.

The Probationary Prembe
Under these circumstances, the argument that could be made by a disgruntled, discharged employee in a wrongful discharge suit seem~ obvious. If an
employee is a temporary or probationary employee who can be terminated
at any time for any reason during some arbitrary probationary period of employment, at the expiration of that probationary period, the employee who
is not discharged must become something else, i.e., a "permanent" employee
who can no longer be discharged without good and/or just cause.
Surprisingly, the authors of this paper were unable to discover any appellate court decisions squarely on point that directly addressed the above theory. A significant number of appellate court decisions did hold that the terms
of an employment agreement between the employer and the employee could
include, in appropriate circumstances, statements made by the employer in
job application forms, employee handbooks, company policy manuals and
occasionally even oral statements of the employer. ' However, a large number of cases examined held, that in the presence of an express disclaimer by
the employer indicating an intent not to be bound by such statements, that
the employer was not so bound. • States adopting the former view include
Arizona, Idaho, Massachusetts, Michigan, Mi nnesota, New Jersey, New Mex24

ico, South Dakota, Utah and Washington. The states of A rizona, California, Idaho, Mississippi, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin also
accept the latter position which, in effect, allows an employer to negate the
earlier proposition.
The only decision that the authors uncovered which expressly dealt with
a probationary period of employment was a Delaware trial court decision,
Edwards v. Luther an Socia l Scniccs of Dover, Inc.' This case is not reported
in the Atlantic 2d reporter. However, it may be found in West Law under
#10271. In Edwards, the plaintiff argued that he wa~ wrongfully discharged
by the Board of Directors of Lutheran Social Services after the expiration
of his initial probationary period of employment because the director\ did
not state the reason for his termination. The trial court appears to have rejected Edwards' argument due to the fact that the directors had previously
voted to extend his probationary period of employment and he was fired
during that extended probationary period. Hence, the court did not reach
the issue of what would have happened had the directors attempted to fire
the plaintiff without cause after the expiration of the probationary period.
Notwithstanding the dearth of case law on the issue, some employers are
currently being advised to practice d efensive employment practices and to
delete any references to probationary periods of employment, causes for termination , and/or progressive discipline procedures from all job applications,
employee handbooks, company policy manuals, and company policy statement~ . A few employers have gone further and have included disclaimers
expressly negati ng any intent 10 be bound by their o,... n policy statements
and reasserting in their various company forms, handbooks, manuab and
policy statement~ that the employment of the employee is at-,, ill and that
the employment may be terminated by the employer at any time, for any
reason, even where that action might connict with other statements or with
implied policies of the employer. The majority of the appellate court decisiom examined by the authors seemed all to eager to uphold \uch disclaimers.'
Conclusio n
To say that the elimination of references to probationary periods of employment in company forms, handbooks, manuals, and policy st atements
is an effective defcnsi,e legal practice is not to say, however. that it is a desirable social policy, or even an effective business practice. Indeed, the employer's strategy or rigidly adhering to an outmoded termination-at-will doctrine
may prove to be counterproductive in terms of lower employee morale and
decreased productivity.•
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TABLE I

Summary Of Case Law
Case
Ref.

Dale

Employee

1985

Stale
Ariz.

2.

1988

Ariz.

No

3.

1983

Calif.

No

4.

1987

Dcla"are

No

5.

19n

Idaho

N,1

6.

1988

Idaho

No

7.

1980

l\la,,.

Ye,

8.

1988

Mas,.

Yes

9.

1988

Ma,,

No

10.

1980

Mich

Ye,

IL

1983

M,nn

Ye,

12.

1986

M um

No

IJ.

1989

Mrrrn .

Ye,

I.

Pre,aib
y.,

Legal Theor~·

Held that provi,ions 111 <'mployce handbook
can modify the employment-at-will rule.
Wrutcn termination-at-will clause in contract
overrode ,amc contract's c,pre-, three year
term.
Written disclaimer in contract over-rode connicting term, of employee manual.
Employee hired on "90-day probalionary statu,· and fired during a ,ccond extension of
that "probationary >latu," "a' an at-will cmploycc unable to >ti.·cc,,tully challenge summary judgment in favor of defendantemplo)er.
D,sclaimcr in employee handboo~ negated
daim that handboo~ crca1cd an implied employment cont rac1.
Slate, that Idaho doc, recognize theory that
employment-at-will doctrine can be modified
by an cwre" or implied agreement and that
the term, of the implied contract can be found
in an employee handboo~. (Rev'd on other
ground,l.
Provision, in employee manual can constitute
part of comract of cmploymcnl.
Provisiom in hospital', ",taff by-laws" ,an
also con,ututc pan of contracl of employmcnt.
Employer, retained nglu to modify employee
manual al any time negaled daim that manual
crea1ed an implied contract of employment.
Held that employer policy ,rarerncnts can ereate terrm ol an implied contract of employmcnt and evidence of tho,c term, can be
founJ in employee rnanuab even "'here cmploycr rciatm the righr 10 modify policies and
term, of manuab at any time. (Contrast "ith
l\!a,,achu,ell, rule above).
Job security provi,ion, in employee handboo~
negated prc,umption of employment-at-will; it
doe, not matter whether handhoo~ i, given to
employet' before or after employment; and no
further consideration i, required from cmployee after receiving handbook other than
contrnued ,ervicc.
Mere long 1crm ,en·ice and good job perfor·
mancc by an employee i, not enough to convcrt at-will employment contract into one
requiring good cause for di,m"~al.
Connict between provisions in company handbook and express at-will sta1cmen1s in contract
of cmploymcnl arc not automatically resolved
in favor of express at -will statements; issue is
one for jury and , ummary judgment for cmplayer is preel uded.
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14.

1987

Miss.

No

15.

1985

New Jer.

Yes

16.

1986

New Jer.

Yes

17.

1988

New Mex.

No

18.

1986

Penn.

No

19.

1983

South Oak.

Yes

20.

1988

South Dal..

No

21.

1989

Utah

Yes

22.

1983

Wash.

No

23.

1983

Wisc.

No

Explicit statements in personnel handbook
negating any implication of employee rights
and restating company's right lo terminate employee at-will were binding even upon an employee with over twenty years good service
with the employer.
Company's employee manual held to create
terms of an implied contract of employment
unless the manual contains a prominent disclaimer.
Issue as 10 whether at-will employees have implied contracts of employment based on cmployer 's personnel policy manuals is a material
question of fact for jury precluding summary
judgment for employer.
Court recognized that an implied contract between employee and employer could modify
the at-will presumption. but court failed to
find an implied contract in this case.
Rejected employee's argument that just cause
statements in employee handbook could modify the at will presumpt10n. Holds that unilaterally issued handbooks arc 1101 binding on
employers in Pennsylvania.
Held that unless the employer's employee
handboo~ contained an explicit disclaimer,
ployer could not unilaterally disregard express
provisions of handbook selling forth causes
and procedures for d1smmal.
Like Minnesota 1hi> court reJected the notion
1ha1 longevity alone can create an implied obligallon modifying the termination-at-will rule.
Recognizes possibility of an implied-in-fact
contract and holds that such an implied contract ,an be based upon an employer's written
disciplinary policy. Rejects employer's argumcnts based on lack of mutuality of obligation
and lack of independent considera11on doctrincs. Goes further 10 hold 1ha1 implied duties
of good fanh and fair dealing also apply 10
employment contracts. Summary judgment for
employer reversed and remanded.
Court recognized that an implied contract of
employment could exist and tha1 such an implied contract could modify the termination-at",II rule, but I he court failed 10 find that em•
player', incentive bonus plan crea1ed an implied contract in th,s case.
Express wrincn statement, signed by employee
al time of hire, acknowledging that employmen1 could be 1crmina1ed at any time. by
either party for any reason negated possibility
of implied contract based on conflic11ng disciplinary policies of employer.

=·
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TABLE 2
Case Citations

I. Wagensellcr v. Scottsdale Memoria l Hos pital, 147 Ariz. 370, 714 P.2d
412 (1984).
2. Norman v. Recreation Centers of S un Cit}, Inc.. 156 Ariz. 425, 752 P.2d
514 (1988).
3. Crain,·. Burroughs Corporation , 560 F. Supp. 849 (Calif. 1983).
4. Ed\\ ards v. Lutheran Social Services of Dover, Inc., not reported in A.2d
1987 West Law 10271 (Del. Super. 1987).
5. Arnold v. Diel C('ntcr. Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040 (Idaho App.
1987).
6. Nils~on

L

Mapco. 115 Idaho 18, 764 P.2d 95 (Idaho App. 1988).

7. Garrit}" ,·. Valle) Vic•\\ Nursing Home, Ma~~- App., 406 N.E.2d 423
(1980).
8. Hobson,·. Mc Lean Hospital Corporation. 402 Mass. 413, 522 N.E.2d
975 (1988).
9 . .Jackson , .. Action for Boston Communit y Development, Inc .. 403 Ma~s.
8, 525 N.E.2d 411 (1988).
10. Toussaint,. Blue Cros~ & Blue S hield of Michigan. Mich., 292 N.W.2d
880 (1980).
11. Pine Rher S tate Bank v. Mettille, 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983).
12. Dumas,·. Kessler & Mai:uire Funeral Home, Inc.. 380 N. W .2d 544 (Minn.
App. 1986).
13. Bratton,. Menard, Inc.. 438 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. App. 1989).
14. Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086 (Miss. 1987).
15. Woolle} ,. Hoffman -LaRoche, Inc .. 99 N.J. 284,491 A.2d 1257 (1985).
16. Giudice v. Drew Chemical Corp., 210 N.J. Super. 32,509 A.2d 200( 1986).
17. Melnick v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Ins. Co•• 106 N.M. 726, 749
P .2d 1105 (1988).
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18. Martin v. Capital Cities Media, Inc., 511 A.2d 830 (Pa. Super. I 986).
19. Ostcrkamp v. Alkota Manufacturing, Inc., 332 N. W .2d 275 (S. D. 1983).
20. Breen v. Dakota Gear & Joint Co., Inc., 433 N.W.2d 221 (S.D. 1988).
21. Berube v. Fashion Center. Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (Utah 1989).
22. Goodpaster v. Pfizer, Inc., 35 Wash. App. 199, 665 p.2d 414 (1983).
23. Holloway v. K-Mart Corporation, 113 Wis. 2d 143, 3J4 N.W.2d 570
(Wisc. App. 1983).
Footnotes
'Jolly, James P. and James G. Frierson. "Playing It Safe," Personnel Administrator 34 (June 1989): 44-50 and Koys, Daniel J., Steven Briggs and
Jay Grenig, "State Court Disparity and Employment-at-Will," Pcn,onnel
Psychology 40, (1987): 565-577.
'Sabine Pilot Sen ice, Inc. ,. Hauck, 687 S. W . 2d 733 (Tex. 1985).
' Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086 (l\fos. 1987).
'Jolly and Frierson, 1989, p. 49.
' Wagcnsrller v. Srnttsdalc Memorial Hospital. 147 Ariz. 370, 714 P.2d 412
(1984). Nilsson,·. Mapco, 115 Idaho 18, 764 P.2d (Idaho App. 1988); Garrity v. Valley Vie~ Nursing Home, Mas~. App., 406 N.E.2d 423 (1980); Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of M ichigan, Mich., 292 M. W .2d 880 ( 1980);
Pinc River State Bank v. Mcttilll', 333 N.W.2d 622 (Minn. 1983); Bratten
v. Menard, 438 N.W.2d 116 (Minn. App. 1989); Guidice v. Dre~ Chemical
Corp., 210 N.J. Super. 32,509 A.2d 200 (1986); Melnick v.State Farm Mutual
Automobile Ins. Co•• 106 N.M. 726, 749 P .2d 1105 ( 1988); Osterkamp v. Aikota Manufacturing, Inc., 332 N. W .2d 275 (S.D. 1983); Berube,. Fashion Center,
Ltd., 771 P.2d 1033 (1989); and Goodpaster v. Pfi1er, Inc., 35 Wash. App.
199,665 P.2d 414 (1983).
•Norman v. Recreation Centers of S un C ity, Inc., 156 Ariz. 425, 752 P.2d
514 (1988); Crain v. Burroughs Corporation , 560 F. Supp. 849 (Calif. 1983);
Arnold v. Diel Center, Inc., 113 Idaho 581, 746 P.2d 1040 (Idaho App. 1987);
Perry v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086 (Miss. 1987); Jackson v. Action for Boston Community De,·clopmcnt, Inc., 403 Ma~~- 8,525 N.E.2d 411
(1988); and Holloway v. K.-Mart Corporation. 113 Wis.:!d 143,334 N.W.2d
570 (Wisc. App. 1983).
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'[dwards ,·. Lutheran Social Services of Don-r, Inc., not reported in A.2d,

1987 West Law ltl027l (Del. Super. 1987).

or

'Norman v. Rccrealion Cenkrs Sun Cit~. Inc.. 156 Ari,._ 425, 752 P .2d
514 ( 1988); Crain ,·. Burroughs Corporation, 560 F. Supp. 849 (Calif. 1983);
Arnold,. Diet Center, Inc. ID Idaho 581,746 P.2d 1040(ldaho App. 1987);
Perr} 1. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 508 So.2d 1086 (Mi\,. 1987); Jal·kson v. Action for Boston Communit~- De,<'lopment, lnr.. 40:1 '\fa,,. R. 525 N.E.2d 411
(1988); and Hollowa} '- K-Mart Corporation, 113 Wi,.2d 14J, 334 N.W.2d
570 (Wh..:. :\pp. 1983).
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